

Consolidated responses - implementing country strategy consultations

The EITI's role in addressing corruption

1. *Is corruption mitigation in the extractive sector among the objectives of your country's MSG for EITI implementation?*

Afghanistan:

Civil society (1)

No, the MSG has been occupied by the validation reports.

Civil society (2)

I believe so. What corruption mitigation is achieved is mainly a result of the transparency over certain contracts and sectors – for example data from EITI has been useful in our own examination of a company in the gold sector.

Albania:

Yes, mitigating corruption in the extractive sector is part of MSG's objectives for implementing EITI Albania. This is intended to be done through:

1. Strengthening the MSG through wider stakeholder participation and capacity building;
2. Increase public participation and stakeholder engagement in natural resource management. Awareness-raising and Communication activities with a particular focus on communication tailored to our stakeholders that will aim to create a platform for professional debate; we have identified some partners in our EITI processes such as students, academics, lawmakers, analysts, MPs, etc. They should be part of the EITI processes and any communication should be tailored to their specifications.

Argentina:

The EITI Argentina Multi-Stakeholder Group considers that implementation of the requirements of the Standard and the systematic disclosure of information is an important step in the fight against corruption. Greater transparency should help reduce corruption in general. In addition, we are establishing governance mechanisms to improve coordination between the different national and provincial authorities involved in making decisions to grant permits and licenses for exploration for and extraction of hydrocarbons and minerals.

Armenia:

Civil society

Corruption issue is not explicitly mentioned as an objective for the MSG of EITI Armenia as it is not really acknowledged to be a problem by all constituencies. However, corruption is widely recognized by the civil society actors as a critical problem and it is in the focus of the civil society constituency accordingly, also influencing its agendas and priorities.

Government

EITI Standard has necessary tools to fight or mitigate corruption in particular open contracts, beneficial ownership disclosures, comprehensive financial transparency of all material financial flows from the extractive sector. Transparency of permit grant procedures, etc. even if MSG does not directly acknowledge mitigation of corruption as a national priority, these tools that assure overall transparency and accountability, generally are basic anti-corruption mechanisms.

Moreover, as a result of an analysis of the legislative sector, gaps in the legislation could be detected and addressed by the Multi-stakeholder Group.

Burkina Faso:

The fight against corruption in Burkina Faso is one of the objectives of the MSG. Within the civil society group, one place is given to the National Anti-Corruption Network (REN-LAC), an organisation whose main mission is the fight against corruption. Some RENLAC activities are included in the EITI-BF Action Plan. REN-LAC and the Court of Auditors have developed a platform, the objectives of which are to fight corruption.

Moreover, as part of implementation of the sectoral policy of the economy, finance and development, the activities of the EITI Permanent Secretariat (EITI-PS) contained in the EITI-BF Work Plan contribute to achieving the goal of "the fight against fraud, forgery and corruption".

Chad:

The EITI-Chad National High Committee has not expressly included the matter of the fight against corruption in the extractive sector among its EITI implementation objectives. The Multi-Stakeholder Group is much more concerned about ownership being taken of the Standard and its implementation in the national sector.

Civil society (1):

Yes. The promotion of transparency is one of the key pillars of the work of the Multi-Stakeholder Group and especially of its civil society component. The dissemination and disclosure of data and the promotion of citizen oversight of the management of resources contribute to the fight against corruption. Also, the reconciliation of data deters corruption.

Civil society (2):

The difficulties that hinder the effective implementation of activities include, among others, the current political context, which does not favour the implementation of activities, the security situation and the economic and financial crises.

Civil society (3):

As things stand at the moment, I do not think that EITI makes it possible to fight against corruption, because it is not involved in the preliminary phases, that is, negotiation and payment of revenue.

Industry:

Corruption in the extractive sector fits well with the objectives of our country's Multi-Stakeholder Group. By encouraging all EITI stakeholders to disclose all financial flows and by practising transparency throughout the entire licensing chain, with a modern, dynamic, transparent, on-line cadastre, corruption will gradually disappear. These items and provisions will effectively help in the fight against corruption.

National Secretariat:

Yes, from the institutionalisation of the EITI, Chad has included provisions for the fight against corruption within its new Code. Raise debate on information about the extractive sector.

Cote d'Ivoire:

The fight against corruption, even if it is not clearly stated in the specific objectives as such, is an objective for the Multi-Stakeholder Group in accordance with the principles of EITI implementation as enshrined in the EITI Standard. Thus, the regular publication of EITI Reports, the disclosure by companies of data, the sought publication of contracts, the implementation of beneficial ownership and other activities within EITI implementation in Côte d'Ivoire contribute to strengthening transparency and constitute a way of fighting against corruption.

Democratic Republic of Congo:

Civil society

No. The Multi-Stakeholder Group is composed of government institutions and is not ready to use EITI to fight against corruption. Furthermore, corruption issues are never resolved by the Multi-Stakeholder Group.

Dominican Republic:

Civil society

To date, this issue has not been discussed in the Multi-Party Group of the EITI-NC, despite the DR being classified by various organizations and/or standards for gauging this problem as a country with high levels of corruption and internally, many sectors of society consider it to be one of the great challenges to face the nation. The opacity and degree of confidentiality within Dominican public institutions is undoubtedly the best breeding ground for its widespread prevalence. The extractive sector does not escape this reality.

Consequently, the following two questions do not have organically consistent responses; and the existence of EITI-RD reports and their availability on an institutional website, with the publication of a limited-circulation executive summary does not make it possible to address, or tentatively measure the degree or level of impact on this problem.

Government

Reducing corruption in the extractive sector does not form part of the current EITI National Committee work plan, but consideration could be given to planning actions with that goal in work programmes for future periods.

Germany:

(No)

Corruption mitigation in the extractive sector is not among the objectives of the MSG for EITI implementation in Germany. However transparency and in particular the EITI reporting are generally a meaningful contribution to prevention and mitigation of corruption. The D-EITI is in support of the global strive for transparency and accountability as well as the fight against corruption in the extractive sector.

Civil society

The fight against corruption must continue to play a central role in the D-EITI reports. Even if the payment reconciliation does not indicate deviations, the MSG should not convey the impression that there are no corruption-related problems in Germany.

Ghana:

Yes, corruption mitigation is one of the key objectives of Ghana's EITI. The Ghana MSG has set itself the task of using the EITI disclosures to combat revenue leakage and abuse in the country's extractive sector.

Guinea:

Yes, it could be one of the objectives of EITI. It is for this reason that section 10 of the Mining Code is dedicated to the fight against corruption.

It is included for this purpose in the Annual Work Plan and Budget (PTBA) and Triennial Work Plan and Budget (PTTB).

Madagaskar:

The fight against corruption is included in the objectives of the Multi-Stakeholder Group for the implementation of EITI, through the voluntary disclosure of information on the Malagasy mining sector, be this on the fiscal and institutional legal framework, the list of mining permits and procedures in this regard, the state of occupation of oil blocks, legal owners, companies with state participation, (list, financial statements and dividends), the production capacity of the business and destination of products, customs statistics on exports, mandatory inspections and the role of the Court of Auditors, payments made by companies to the State, customs receipts, the distribution of mining administration expenses (FAM), the General Directorate of the Treasury (DGT) activity report, reports on companies' social policies and achievements, the share of the mining sector in general in the national economy, as well as the share of certain companies' payments and activities in the national economy.

Mauritania:

In its primary mission of providing the public with all the data on the payments declared by oil, gas and mining companies and the revenues received the State from extractive industry operations, our view is that this essentially contributes to minimising the effects of corruption in the extractive industries sector. The availability of this information has enabled the Multi-Stakeholder Group to detect shadowy areas in certain activities, including the allocation of licenses to politically-exposed persons, and to request further clarification.

Netherlands:

Government

I believe that the EIT's role in addressing corruption is very much fit for EITI.

Niger:

Yes, the fight against corruption is one of the objectives of the MSG, in accordance with the MSG action plan, which plans to work for the effectiveness of transparency in the extractive sector.

Effective transparency and citizen control help to limit corruption.

Philippines:

Civil society

Yes. There are two major ways of mitigating corruption that is being practices by PH-EITI. First, is the consistency of the revenue data among the different agencies. The variations are always checked and reconciled requesting for more detailed data explaining the inconsistency; (2) Research on Beneficial Ownership and Politically Inclined Person. PH-EITI has been seriously following the research on BO and are testing the BO questionnaires among the participating extractive industries. However, this is not yet fully operational because the other extractives are not yet free enough to report their BO.

Government

Yes. The annual reporting of what the government receives and the private sector pays is a useful tool in ensuring transparency and accountability in the extractive sector. Likewise, the regular MSG meetings serve as a transparent platform wherein all stakeholders can freely discuss or have dialogue on relevant issues pertaining to the extractive sectors.

- The discussion paper commissioned by the EITI about the role of EITI in fighting corruption (June 2019), including its contribution and limitations, is interesting and acceptable.
- Transparency should lead to less corruption.

Industry

Yes. One of the primary objectives of PH-EITI is to strengthen government systems for natural resource governance, with an eye towards addressing perceived corruption risks in the granting and maintenance of mineral agreements, as well as in the payment of subnational fees and impositions.

National Secretariat

Although corruption mitigation is not expressly stated in PH-EITI's objectives, it is subsumed and assumed under the objectives in line with strengthening systems of natural resource governance/management. The MSG has used EITI to help address corruption mainly through transparency (disclosure of information) and multisectoral discussion of relevant information and issues towards reform.

Republic of Congo:

The fight against corruption is not a direct action, but the result of EITI implementation, which provides reliable and verifiable information to the bodies formally authorised for these actions.

Senegal:

Yes. The fight against corruption is one of the objectives of the MSG. However, the MSG contributes to the work of national bodies dedicated to the fight against corruption (technical steering committee, institutional partnership). This is to avoid duplication. Also the disclosure of beneficial ownership is used as an instrument to fight against corruption, through collaboration with the Ministry of Justice for the establishment of a public register.

Sierra Leone:

Yes.

- By tracking extractive revenue inflow to government by mining companies, as well as government's acknowledgement through receipts, and identifying discrepancies and investigating them;
- By identifying policy gaps in the extractive governance;
- The MSG achieved the EITI's contract transparency requirement. All mining contracts are now publicly accessible through the National Minerals Agency website.
- Pushing extractive companies to report on their beneficial owners.
- The MSG has always encouraged the political leadership to make public declarations in support of using the EITI to fight corruption.

Tanzania:

Yes, Because EITI helps people to realize the benefits of the countries' endowments of oil, gas and minerals and therefore addressing corruption in the extractive sector is key for better utilization of revenues.

How the TEITI MSG is using the EITI to mitigate corruption;

- *Through the Disclosure of tax and other payments made by extractive companies to the government.*

Since payments made by extractive companies are made public by the EITI reporting, this allows citizen to debate on the payments that violates the laws.

- *Disclosure of Beneficial ownership information*

Among the other thing, the disclosure helps to reducing risks such as tax evasion and conflict of interests; increasing trust and accountability; enhancing revenue collection by controlling owners who evade/dodge tax by concealing behind shadow companies; improving rule of law; improving investment climate; and preventing corruption.

- *Through licenses and license allocations.*

The approaches of awarding/transferring mineral rights are regarded as effective and efficient as they are conducted in a very transparent manner. They reduce the chances of malpractices in awarding or transferring Licences because all applications are logged and processed in an open system (Mining Cadastre). Moreover, the system allows an entity to appeal in a situation that one is not satisfied with the process or decision of awarding/transferring a mining Licence to another entity

- *Subnational payments and transfers.*

The disclosure of service levy received by local government authorities helps to determine not only the amount of money which these councils collect, but also to account for the expenditures of such receipts. This effort has contributed in informing the public as to what extent service levy receipts have been allocated for development expenditures and therefore management or use of the funds become easy in case there is a chance of corruption risks.

Timor-Leste:

Industry

Corruption mitigation in the extractive sector is one of the objective understood by MSG members. The publication of annual EITI Report and government's effort to ensure transparency in contract award within extractive industry could be identified as efforts to mitigate corruption in the country.

Trinidad and Tobago:

The EITI is viewed in T&T as an anti-corruption initiative. The TTEITI provides independent verification and assurance on what we earn from the oil, gas and mining sector. Intuitively, if an independent verification mechanism assures there is no missing revenue, this builds public trust. The major issue with reconciliation is that it is costly and in the past seven years there has been little differences between company and Government payments (0.0067% difference) and there have been no unidentified receipts. The TTEITI, in its national beneficial ownership public sensitization campaign, has used the EITI's stance on secret company disclosure to inform its messaging to civil society, Government agencies and extractive companies.

Civil society

Trinidad & Tobago Transparency Institute (TTTI) as one of the stakeholders on the MSG believes that the MSG is using the EITI to mitigate corruption. The MSG has encouraged and advocated for transparency in the extractive sectors, producing reports which have reconciled the revenue payments from the extractive companies with the Government receipts from the extractive sector. This process of

reconciliation has undoubtedly mitigated corruption by shining a light on detailed financial flows, thus promoting transparency, good governance and accountability. The MSG has also promoted the Beneficial Ownership Disclosure Requirement which requires publicly disclosing the identities of owners of companies in the extractive sector and the push for more companies to list on the Beneficial Ownership Registry and thus improve transparency. Of course, the MSG has not eliminated corruption, for as the Independent Administrator, BDO noted in the 2017 TTEITI report “ The checks and balances in the system are working and show that Trinidad & Tobago is achieving revenue transparency and accountability... however, a conclusion cannot be drawn that the extractive sectors are completely free of corruption ...the EITI process ... will not expose corruption that might occur in the sectors’ value chain...” (Recall the A&V Oil and Gas scandal where Petrotrin paid A&V for oil which was not received).

Ukraine:

MSG is not using the EITI for corruption mitigation in the extractive sector because of the time gap of the EITI Report for 2 years and absence of on-line version of the EITI data. After the discussion with the anti-corruption activists it was discovered that they consider the EITI Report data outdated and pdf format of the Reports not enough user friendly.

UK:

(No)

The extractives sector in the UK does not present a significant corruption risk, so this is not a key focus for the UK. The UK government is addressing corruption risk through more general approaches (i.e. not extractives focused), particularly the UK Government-wide Anti-Corruption Strategy 2017-22, which includes a commitment to champion the EITI domestically and support developing countries to comply with the EITI Standard. The Strategy covers domestic and international issues and has 134 commitments, on which the UK government reports annually to Parliament. The MSG believes that this broad approach to addressing corruption is appropriate response, given the UK’s environment . The MSG was pleased to recently welcome a representative from the Government’s Joint Anti-Corruption Unit as an MSG member, to provide a greater focus on anti-corruption work taking place across Government

2. What corruption risks in your country do you want the EITI to address, e.g. in licensing, contract negotiations, tax evasion, etc?

Afghanistan:

Civil society (1)

The corruption risks in Afghanistan which we want the EITI to address are: Procurement, audit and supervision in the implementation of mining contracts, and beneficial ownership.

Civil society (2)

- Corruption around payments (e.g. underpayment/under declaration of production)
- Illegal mining (e.g. emerald mines – completely off the books despite collectively being well above threshold scale)
- Licensing (transparency in licensing process – e.g. declaration of BO before grant of license)
- Artisanal mining – at least as an overview, especially where linked to armed groups

Albania:

One of the corruption risks that EITI must address is tax evasion and contract negotiation.

Argentina:

Allocation of licenses and permits, contract negotiations and decision-making mechanisms, environmental and social impact assessments, relationships with indigenous communities, traceability of revenues and spending, supplier management, employment matters.

Armenia:

Civil society

There are corruption risks in the licensing (extraction permit) process, which have been revealed and discussed in Transparency International Anticorruption Center’s report <https://transparency.am/en/publications/view/208>. The report has addressed the flows and the quality of the Environmental Impact Assessment review (expertise), transparency of the Geological Review (expertise), engagement of public officials in the mining business, payments to charity funds associated with public officials, low transparency, poor cost-benefit analysis, etc. At the moment there is an ongoing study by Transparency International Anticorruption Center of the corruption risks in the post-permit process that intends to address taxation, compliance with the project documents, reporting, oversight, etc. All the findings of both studies can and shall become subject for consideration by MSG.

Burkina Faso:

Every part of the extractive industries value chain is susceptible to be part of corruption except for contracts, where all companies are required to sign a standard agreement that can not go against the requirements of the Mining Code.

EITI needs to monitor the process of, the granting of mining and exploitation rights, of marketing and of the payment of benefits.

The corruption risks that we would like EITI to combat, concern all the elements of the extractive-sector value chain except for contracts, where all companies are required to sign a standard agreement that can not go against the requirements of the Mining Code.

Chad:

Here, one can analyse risks of corruption in requirements 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6.

Civil society (1)

The institutional reform of 2018 established the Fourth Republic and changed the administrative organisation of the country, opting for highly decentralised unitary state, changing the number of provinces to 23, of départements to 107 and of communes to 377, while at the same time reducing the level of decentralisation from 4 to 2. This institutional reform strengthens the power of the President of the Republic under the presidential system and sets the presidential term at six years, renewable once, while eliminating the post of Prime Minister.

However, according to the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, Chad is ranked in 159th place out of 176 countries. Moreover, despite the decentralisation of the administration and management of public affairs, the administrative organisation of Chad continues to be strongly marked by the concentration of certain State services in the capital, especially basic social services.

Chad remains classified among the 10 poorest countries with a low Human Development Index (HDI), albeit up on recent years. This ranking is a reflection of limited enrolment of school-age

children and a life expectancy lower than world and African averages. The proportion of the population living below the poverty threshold has fallen from 55% in 2003 to 46.7% in 2016

Civil society (2)

License allocations, contract negotiations, tax evasion, procurement, community facilities (compensation), etc.

Industry

EITI should become further involved in the area of licensing. Improvements are to be hoped for with the new provisions of the Mining and Oil Code, which requires files to be subject to the scrutiny of the National Assembly. There is still much to be done to ensure transparency in contract negotiations.

National Secretariat

Contract negotiations; tax evasion.

Cote d'Ivoire:

The procedures for the allocations of licenses and contracts, the choice of operators, and the risks of tax evasion. Furthermore, the EITI-NC attaches particular importance to the accuracy of published financial statements.

Democratic Republic of Congo:

Civil society

Risk around the beneficial ownership of extractive companies, risks around tax evasion in statements of income paid to government entities, risks around allocating licenses to persons with no experience of mining, risks of allocating licenses to speculators rather than to genuine mining investors.

Dominican Republic:

Civil society

The most important and impactful is undoubtedly that relative to contract negotiations. We have historically had "bad contracts" and metals mining has for all time been carried out under special contracts. The Government has made no effort to create frameworks for mining negotiations with clearly established or permitted criteria or standards in relation to economic/financial and environmental-compliance variables or parameters. This means that negotiations are conducted within a framework of almost total confidentiality. It is also noteworthy that Congress has approved contracts when the Members of Congress have admitted that they have neither read nor studied the contract.

CS representatives on EITI-RD have reiterated on innumerable occasions the lack of technical/financial criteria for the granting of licenses but to date these have fallen on deaf ears; as it is the private disposal of a public good that is granted under the protection of great opacity with the potential to become a private business through a simple transfer of rights process.

Regarding tax evasion, the first question to ask is whether the oversight of mining production by relevant public bodies is appropriate and consistent. Are transactions between parent companies and subsidiaries and their terms and transfer prices adequately regulated? How are "payments to abroad" with high potential to impact on costs and expenses and to reduce profits regulated? Are corporate shareholders lenders at the same time? These and other questions

must be properly answered and supported to determine whether compliance with fiscal responsibility is aligned with the Law and contracts.

The Dominican Republic may provide an example that possibly raises questions about this matter. The General Directorate of Customs (DGA) decided some years ago to suspend one or more shipments from a mining company based in the country until their mineral content was verified and for that purpose it authorised the creation of a metallurgical laboratory for its assessments.

Government

We understand that the way in which licenses are allocated, contract negotiations are conducted and tax evasion, among others, may foster corruption. These, therefore, would be topics likely to be debated by the EITI Committee in order to make recommendations to implementing countries.

Ghana:

The corruption risks that the Ghana EITI is interested in addressing cuts across the value chain of the extractive industry. These are: licencing, contract negotiations, revenue management, sub-national transfers and expenditures, including Quasi-fiscal expenditures.

Guinea:

This risk in the allocations of licenses and permits. It is for this reason that new license-allocation procedures were established. A new cadastral procedure was established and the cadastre has been cleansed and modernised.

Madagaskar:

Lack of transparency in the rules on license allocations, disclosure of oil contracts, and disclosure of beneficial ownership to combat money laundering.

Mauritania:

In our country, Mauritania, the most likely risks of corruption are related to the conditions for the allocation of licenses. The proliferation of license allocations to persons who are not technically and financially qualified leads to a situation of speculation that boosts the role of intermediaries and corruption, to the detriment of the public good. The services and supply sector also provides fertile ground for corruption. Several practices show that businesses, for reasons of "political licence", grant undue, and therefore corrupt, facilities to leaders and their families: This issue was highlighted by an enquiry by the famous United States Securities and Exchange Commission.

Niger:

The risks of corruption are as follows:

- The absence of clear, transparent rules for the allocation of licenses (manual of procedures) can be a source of corruption;
- Contract negotiations;
- Tax evasion, mainly from a lack of State control and from the quality of representation of the State within the boards of directors of extractive companies.

Philippines:

Civil society

The poor civic space given to the CSOs by the government. Although there is a recognition of the Civic space to some extent, it is limited to attendance in meetings and participation in conferences. The CSOs should have a significant presence in the entire value chain of the Extractive Industry operations and the the government interaction with the extractives.

Government

Tax evasion and tax avoidance are among the corruption risks that can be addressed by the EITI annual reporting.

Industry

- The granting, maintenance, and renewal of mineral agreements/licenses
- The creation, imposition, and enforcement of local fees, taxes, and charges specific to mining
- Beneficial ownership restrictions (foreign ownership) and involvement of politically exposed persons.

Republic of Congo:

The fight against corruption is integrated into the Government's programme.

The information reported must be validated by the Multi-Stakeholder Group as corruption risks.

Senegal:

Risks of corruption may emerge if the procedures for the allocation of permits and licenses are not well defined. This is why the MSG has set up a working group, together with the Ministry of Mines and Geology, to draft a manual of procedures dedicated to the specification of the technical and financial criteria for the granting of licenses and permits.

Sierra Leone:

Stakeholders were of the view that, though SLEITI and the government are working hard to inject transparency into Sierra Leone's extractive sector, yet there is a general perspective that corruption is still a serious issues in the sector. Therefore, they cannot exclude any of the known corruption issues which the EITI is already working on.

Stakeholders unanimously agreed that EITI should engage on addressing ALL corruption cases identified across the various stages of the extractive industry value chain. This is because at every stage, there is high potential for corruption.

Tanzania:

Both licensing, contract negotiation, tax evasion, beneficiation are vital and pose significant corruption risk. Our view, the focus should now be on the correctness, accuracy and timely payment of government tax, levies, fees and licenses rather than merely reconciliation of government receipts and companies' payments.

Trinidad and Tobago:

Tax evasion and tax avoidance linked to transfer mispricing has been a major talking point for Government during the current period of low revenue and the issue was also ventilated in the country's Gas Master Plan. Civil society has also raised questions on whether the country receives fair value for its resources and have called for contract transparency.

Civil society

Some of the risks to be addressed are the corruption risks which occur in the value chain as well as the tax evasion and illegal activities which occur in the mining/quarrying sector due, inter alia, to the apparent poor and inefficient licencing regime in the Ministry of Energy & Energy Industries (MEEI). There are many issues/problems plaguing the quarrying sector. They include: Millions in outstanding royalties due from mining/quarrying companies; a need to issue more licences and independently verify production from companies operating in the sector to collect the proper royalties and taxes. Also the negative externalities and costs to society that come from illegal quarrying like flooding, cost to WASA for desilting, etc. The MSG, through the Independent Administrator has recommended that the MEEI procure drones to help verify production and royalties due to the State and develop a time bound plan to expedite the licensing process for quarry companies. One of the main causes of a lot of problems and corruption in the quarrying sector appears to be the failure of the MEEI to issue licences in a timely manner. TTTI as one of the stakeholders on the MSG has been looking at ways to assist the MEEI as the regulatory body. TTTI believes that committed, ethical leaders and managers can be regarded as one of the first lines against corruption. Consequently, with logistical support from Parliament, TTTI is looking at an Ethics Program for the Public Service, beginning with the MEEI. The program is titled: Mandate of Hope: Striving for Public Sector Excellence. The idea being to introduce the Ethics Module as a striving for excellence in the Public Service. Hence, spurring greater efficiency in the delivery of the services provided by the MEEI and other Ministries/Departments to be identified by Parliament.

Ukraine:

- Contract negotiation;
- Analyzing of the conditions of the contracts;

UK:

There are no particular issues that we wish to address in the UK.

3. Which of the following recommendations would be feasible and would the MSG in your country be interested to implement?

1. *Clearly articulating EITI's role in fighting corruption through EITI's communication strategy and sensitisation of stakeholders on the EITI Code of Conduct*
2. *Exposing corrupt practices that are vulnerable to abuse by developing practical guidance on how EITI reporting could inform discussions on anti-corruption at the country level*
3. *Together with partners, facilitate transparency and multi-stakeholder engagement around known areas of risk and share good disclosure practices related to subcontracting*
4. *Continue work with supporting companies to showcase good company approaches in fighting corruption.*
5. *Engaging with anti-corruption actors as users of EITI data*
6. *Engaging with anti-corruption actors on shared issues of concern related to the extractives*
7. *Doing post mortem analysis of anti-corruption cases*

Afghanistan:

Civil society (1)

(Agree with recommendations 1, 2, 5, 6 and 7)

Civil society (2)

Much welcome this. Some thoughts:

- EITI in Afghanistan is failing to highlight some glaringly obvious corruption and conflict risks around mining. For example, the country has zero declared income from emerald mines despite the fact that extensive and quite organized exploitation is going on in an area that is amongst the most secure in the country. At a minimum, EITI should be putting Ministers on the spot over this and highlighting it as a concern in its reports.
- Implementation of transparency procedures in Afghan law: MSG could examine how well anti-corruption requirements in the relevant Afghan laws are being implemented. For example, the law requires publication of production and payment data for mining – but this has often been low quality and it is hard to guarantee it is up to date or comprehensive. The MSG could be highlighting areas where the law (or government) is failing to do its job and call out relevant departments and tracking remedial commitments to implement.
- Similarly, recommendations and concerns raised in previous EITI validation reports are rarely pursued after publication. For example, a report might highlight a failure to get data from a government department, or major discrepancies, or major issues with data quality, but there is little follow up on why this occurred and whether remedial actions have been taken – so there is little momentum gained from one report to another.
- Promoting alternative models of mining: the MSG could encourage government to trial alternative models of mining (such as community owned mines) – examining which changes could be useful and making recommendations.
- A final critical point: EITI produces a lot of data which is then never examined. Partnerships for example with universities, international NGOs, media etc are needed to ensure the data actually translates to spotting irregularities.

Albania:

(Agree with recommendations 5, 6 and 7)

Argentina:

(Agree with all recommendations)

Armenia:

(Agree with recommendations 1, 2, 5 and 6)

The EITI Armenia MSG may adopt a statement on formulating the recognition of corruption risks existing in the sector.

Burkina Faso:

(Agree with recommendations 1, 5, 6 and 7)

Chad:

(Agree with recommendations 1, 3, 5 and 6)

Civil society (1)

(Agree with recommendation 1, 4, 5, 6 and 7)

In the short term, the issue for Chad is to improve the quality of public finance management in order to promote a healthy and predictable macro-economic environment.

Beyond the National Development Plan PND 2017-2021, Chad needs to include the funding of investment into a transparent institutional framework bringing together the sectoral departments, the local authorities and the planning and finance departments.

Civil society (2)

(Agree with recommendation 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6)

Civil society (3)

(Agree with recommendations 1, 4, 5 and 6)

Cote d'Ivoire:

(Agree with all recommendations)

Democratic Republic of Congo:

Civil society

(Agree with recommendations 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6)

Dominican Republic:

Civil society

(Agree with recommendations 2, 3, 6 and 7)

Government

(Agree with recommendations 1, 3, 4 and 5)

Germany:

Civil society

We welcome the measures taken so far to create more transparency. Yet, we see a considerable backlog, firstly, in the transparency of the issuing of permit notices and, above all, insight into environmental requirements that have been issued. Secondly, there is a need to improve the transparency of shareholdings and access to the transparency register. Furthermore, in the course of the implementation of the 5th Money Laundering Directive, in addition to the elimination of the "legitimate interest", access must be generally provided free of charge.

Ghana:

Already, the Ghana EITI is becoming a bit overburdening for most of its institutional stakeholders, particularly for the companies and government agencies. Adding more responsibilities run the risk of turning the initiative into a full-time job. It is the view of the Ghana MSG that the EITI should restrict itself to the disclosures and dissemination of reports, and allow communities and civil society stakeholders to use the information to demand anti-corruption reforms. Maybe, some corruption risk assessments can be incorporated into the reports by way of commentary on specific observations.

In the Ghana context, the Civil Society Platform on Oil and Gas (CSPOG), a stakeholder in Ghana's EITI was supported by STAR Ghana Foundation to use information from the Ghana reports to identify the typology and nature of corruption risks in Ghana's extractive sector. The group is now

using its report to engage relevant anti-corruption agencies and industry regulators to address the identified risks.

Guinea:

(Agree with recommendations 1, 5 and 6)

Madagaskar:

(Agree with recommendations 1, 6 and 7)

Mauritania:

(Agree with recommendations 1,2 5,6 and 7)

Niger:

(Agree with recommendations 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6)

Philippines:

(Agree with recommendations 1,3 and 4)

Civil society

The CSOs have very little significance in insuring the presence of transparency, accountability and responsibility but it would be excellent if the CSOs are consulted in a national level.

Government

Institutionalization of PH-EITI through legislation

Industry

- A global standard and process for beneficial ownership disclosure must be developed. There is currently no workable or practicable template or guidance from EITI international secretariat on how to make BO disclosure efficient, accurate, and useable by stakeholders.
- The reporting template and procedure must be re-examined to truly surface corruption/irregularities in the payment of taxes, fees, royalties, and other government impositions. Variance (or the lack thereof) between what governments and companies declare does not necessarily equate to corruption (or the lack thereof). Disclosures must relate tax payments to declared production volume and value to determine whether the correct taxes were paid.

Republic of Congo:

(Agree with recommendations 4, 5 and 6)

Senegal:

(Agree with recommendations 1, and 3)

Ensure that the EITI does not replace other bodies, such as OFNAC (National Agency for the Fight against Fraud and Corruption) and CENTIF (National Financial Information Processing Unit) with national responsibility for the fight against corruption. To recap, EITI is an organisation neither of investigation nor inspection. EITI promotes access to information on the extractive industry value chain.

Sierra Leone:

Stakeholders agreed that all the 7 points are relevant as they appropriately fit into Sierra Leone's context.

In addition, the MSG should be seen proactively adopting and promoting the best practices employed on the national, regional and global in the fight against corruption in the extractive sector.

Tanzania:

(Agree with recommendations 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6)

Timor-Leste:

Industry

These recommendations are relevant to the effort to fight corruption, however, it is very important to identify the practicality for the implementation in each country.

Trinidad and Tobago:

(Agree with recommendations 2 and 7)

The sharing of best practices and case studies from other EITI implementing countries on these recommendations can be part of the EITI International Secretariat's work plan (through webinars etc.).

Civil society

(Agree with all recommendations)

Ukraine:

EITI should concentrate more on the global analysis of the extractive sector in the countries to prevent the corruption in future via the legislative instruments rather than identifying the existing corruptive cases.

UK:

(Agree with recommendations 1,3,4,5 and 6.)

4. Does the MSG foresee any risks in taking a more proactive stance in using the EITI process in fighting corruption?

Afghanistan:

Civil society (1)

One risk is that we may not be able to succeed in this effort. After some time, people may call those involved in the MSG as ineffective. Therefore, we should be strategic in focusing on low-hanging fruit in the initial phases.

Civil society (2)

Higher risk of blowback from corrupt actors, but can be mitigated to some extent by focusing on policy reforms. But it is hard to function effectively without highlighting specific cases – and EITI can probably do this more safely than for example Afghan media actors.

Albania:

One of the steps that EITI needs to take is to ensure that companies applying for or holding a participating interest in a license, contract, or oil, gas or mining contract in their country, disclose their beneficial owners. This will be possible through the Beneficial Ownership Register.

Argentina:

No risks are anticipated.

Armenia:

Civil society

Explicit recognition of corruption by MSG means that the mining companies shall confess that they have been somehow engaged in corruption, hence we do not find it much realistic. More appropriate would be acknowledgement of corruption risks and the vulnerabilities that might allow for corruption to take place and development of a joint plan to address the existing gaps and loopholes.

A proactive stance would also entail that mining companies accurately disclose their beneficial ownership, however at the moment this seems to be problematic. First, companies listed in international stock exchanges do not report on their beneficial owners, which leaves doubts of their connection with local or international politicians or high ranking officials. We find this as a global problem, which has to be tackled at the global level the sooner the better. Second, the information reported by the companies as a requirement of EITI Standard might not necessarily be accurate. Accuracy and verification of information about the beneficial ownership is a universal problem hence its solution also needs to be discussed at international and higher levels.

Government

Fight against corruption should be considered in the framework of transparency and accountability. Stressing this topic vigorously and separately may cause misunderstanding of the role functions of EITI. There are anti-corruption bodies in each country, so EITI can support ecosystem of integrity by fostering transparency.

Burkina Faso:

A proactive stance is always necessary. The great risk is that of a conflict of powers because structures already exist in Burkina Faso with mandates in the fight against corruption. For better action, this would require a unity of action within the Steering Committee.

Chad:

Civil society (1)

Yes. The safety of actors. Legal provisions need to be enacted to protect whistleblowers.

Civil society (2)

This issue should be included into the powers of EITI to ensure that the public authorities do not draw back from providing the EITI with reliable information.

Industry

No

National Secretariat

Yes, the proactive use of the process in the fight against corruption could be hazardous if it is not within the framework of a law.

Cote d'Ivoire:

Yes, it might be the low or non-involvement of countries, companies refusing to provide the data requested, but also risks to the safety of members. There could also be risks associated with the reliability of data over the entire value chain. This is why, given that this mission has an undeniable political component, certain institutions and decision-making bodies would have to be involved. In Côte d'Ivoire, we would have to join forces with the best-equipped services in certain domains, such as, the General State Inspectorate, the Directorate-General of the Portfolio of the State, the Court of Auditors, the High Authority for Good Governance, and the National Commission for Human Rights, and put risk-mitigation measures in place.

Democratic Republic of Congo:

Civil society

I do not think that the Multi-Stakeholder Group adopting a more proactive stance in the use of the EITI process in the fight against corruption would entail risks since we have a political leadership in DRC that wants to fight corruption in the entire sector. If the Multi-Stakeholder Group adopts a proactive stance in the use of the EITI process in the fight against corruption, it will be supported by the current political leadership in DRC.

Dominican Republic:

Civil society

Two types of risk may occur through action or omission. The non-participation in EITI of non-metals mining companies, gravel-extraction companies and Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining (ASSM) affected by corrupt practices; and the lack of empowered participation of SC in the process and in EITI. Both situations present high risks in the sub-sector. Improving regulation and oversight from the public sphere and implementing awareness-raising programmes directed at SC and the companies, allowing a weighing of the costs and benefits of fighting corruption and belonging to EITI may be a healthy measure.

Government

We do not foresee problems if the EITI is more proactive in the fight against corruption in the extractive industries, due to the fact that every sector is aware of the fact that the EITI Standard seeks transparency in the sector. However, there may well be natural resistance by the actors involved.

Ghana:

The initiative risks spreading itself too thin, if it expands its scope to cover the fight against corruption. CSOs working on corruption issues should rather be supported to use EITI disclosures to further their anti-corruption campaigns. State institutions responsible for fighting corruption should also be oriented to take interest in EITI reports from anti-corruption perspective

Guinea:

We believe that EITI should remain in its corruption-prevention role because other national and international bodies can play this proactive role. Such organisations as the United Nations, which count more than 180 countries as members.

Madagascar:

It may be that adoption of a more proactive stance could be considered by other actors as opposition to development, or even an anti-mining stance. However, taking this stance using clearly-stated arguments promotes debate on the challenges and opportunities around good governance of extractive resources.

Mauritania:

The adoption of a more proactive stance in the fight against corruption within the EITI Process would be sure to raise fears among the enterprises and leaders of our States, because this deal generally benefits these two groups, in the one case for their personal agendas and for the other, for their "political licence". These risks can be mitigated when the leaders of States demonstrate their commitment to comply with good practice. This took place in Mauritania when the new government arising from the 2005 coup was seeking international legitimacy. They joined EITI and developed a range of policies in the field of transparency and the fight against corruption. Conduct outreach campaigns to ensure that companies understand that only compliance with the Law and regulation shall prevail.

Niger:

We believe that adoption of a more proactive stance vis à vis the EITI Process in the fight against corruption is a beautiful ideal for preserving the good of current and future generations and of local development. The resistance to change on the part of the various actors could constitute the main risk. This risk can be mitigated by awareness-raising and education.

Philippines:

Civil society

No. Not really because it is one of the concerns that the MSG CSOs should do to be able to ensure absence of corruption.

Government

No

Industry

Yes. The reporting template/process is not really designed to expose corruption. We must re-examine our reporting template and procedure to truly surface corruption/irregularities in the payment of taxes, fees, royalties and other government impositions. Variance (or the lack thereof) between what governments and companies declare does not necessarily equate to corruption (or the lack thereof). Disclosures must relate tax payments to declared production volume and value to determine whether the correct taxes were paid.

Republic of Congo:

Our MSG has not yet taken a position on a more proactive stance.

Senegal:

Such an approach may be risky if it is not well thought through with all stakeholders. The risks are: lack of understanding of the approach, blocking the process, and insufficient resources. Actors will need to be reassured regarding the nature of the EITI as a complementary tool in the fight against corruption.

Sierra Leone:

Yes.

RISK	MITIGATION STRATEGY
<p>Political Risk</p> <p>Eg.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Political interference; - Conflict of interest 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Promote visionary leadership 2. Promote inclusivity; 3. Enforcing regulation; 4. Policy reforms
<p>Economic risk - State capture</p> <p>Eg. Most of the active players supporting the work of EITI are economically vulnerable</p>	<p>Minimal support to EITI front liners; promote integrity and internal watch</p>
<p>Reputational Risk</p> <p>Some MSG members might not want to lose face of affiliation</p>	<p>Promote integrity, independence and transparency. Let mandates of EITI country representatives be legally identified and supported</p>
<p>Weak legal EITI framework</p>	<p>Strong provision in the EITI guiding policies on the fight against corruption.</p> <p>Strong collaboration between EITI and other extractive sector institutions</p>

Tanzania:

There is a risk that EITI be perceived as duplicating the efforts of established authorities and bodies for fighting corruptions. EITI can be used to create checks and balances and participate in strengthening the anti corruption institutions as well as creating awareness to the general public in addition to the extractive industries campaigns.

Trinidad and Tobago:

Political: Elections are due every five years and depending on the timing of the intervention or disclosure on a particular issue, there may be a perception that the TTEITI is engaging in “partisan posturing” etc.

Image of Partners: The EITI is a multi-stakeholder initiative and the risk of one stakeholder/member of the MSG being involved in a scandal may taint the TTEITI in the eyes of the public. This can dilute the impact of anti-corruption messaging as the “scandal” may be

linked to allegations of tax avoidance, oil spills or other issues that impacts public perception of the MSG - the Peter pays for Paul principle.

Civil society

No. As far as TTI is concerned, there are no obvious risks in taking a more proactive stance in using the EITI to fight corruption. The MSG is made up of representatives from Government, Extractive Sector Companies and Civil Society Organizations whose deliberations and collaborations have always had one aim: *promotion of transparency and accountability in the Extractive Sector*. Moreover, through its reporting, the TTEITI is already publicly perceived as somewhat of an anti-corruption body.

Ukraine:

EITI role as a platform for open dialog could be changed to more formal discussions

5. What are the opportunities in your country (e.g. broader national reforms, strong anti-corruption policies) that the MSG could leverage in its work against corruption in the extractive sector?

Afghanistan:

Civil society (1)

There is a lot of pressure from donors and international community. In addition, the government is under pressure from people too to fight corruption. Also there is some willingness in the government to fight corruption. The government has recently expedited the process of establishing anti-corruption commission.

Civil society (2)

- Revised mining has many useful tools that need using.
- Opportunities for links with local communities structures (e.g. community councils in mining areas) to provide them data and have on the ground sense of issues with mining projects.

Albania:

The MSG can use and collaborate with the established anti-corruption structures of the Albanian government, such as: HIDAA, Prevention of Money Laundering, High State Audit, Anti-Corruption Structure in the Prime Minister office and can exploit in its work the national reforms being implemented in the field of extractive industry and energy.

Argentina:

Transparency of information and its disclosure is an opportunity for organisations that use and interpret data to highlight and combat malpractice, mainly in the public sector.

Armenia:

Civil society

Post-revolutionary government of Armenia has a political will to tackle corruption, so MSG, if it could come to a consensus, does have a real chance to raise and tackle corruption issues in the mining sector.

Government

This year the Government of the Republic of Armenia approved the Anti-corruption Strategy.

Burkina Faso:

During the transition, Burkina Faso adopted an anti-corruption law, but it is not sufficiently applied.

In its fight against corruption in the extractive sector, the MSG could derive opportunities from the following laws:

- Law No. 016-2016/AN on the fight against money laundering and the financing of terrorism in Burkina Faso;
- Law No. 004-2015/CNT preventing and suppressing corruption in Burkina Faso;
- Organic Law No. 082-2015/CNT on the powers, composition, organisation and operation of the Higher State Authority for Inspection and the Fight against Corruption (ASCE-LC).

Chad:

There has been a fierce struggle for some time now against those who corruptly use public funds. The Multi-Stakeholder Group can become involved in this if the matter is explicitly addressed in the Standard in a new requirement or in existing sub-requirements.

Civil society

Dissemination of the anti-corruption law.

Industry

The personal involvement of the President of the Republic in the fight against corruption, through bodies such as the General State Inspectorate, official pronouncements and speeches are an opportunity that the Multi-Stakeholder Group can put to good use in its fight against corruption in the extractive sector.

National Secretariat

Broader national reforms (reform of public finances, e.g. the use of banking for revenues, the citizen budget, etc.)

Cote d'Ivoire:

Institutions and decision-making bodies exist in Côte d'Ivoire. There would be a need to involve these more and inspire them to act more.

Democratic Republic of Congo:

Civil society

For now in DRC, there is a political commitment by political leaders to fight corruption, the engagement of donors and technical and financial partners to fight corruption, and reforms currently being debated in Parliament. We think that the time is right for the Multi-Stakeholder Group to adopt actions to fight corruption using the EITI process.

Dominican Republic:

Civil society

Opportunities to consider, among others: i) Strengthening EITI in DR; ii) Taking advantage of the ongoing debate about reforms to deepen anti-corruption policies and actions; and iii) The

incorporation into the EITI Standard of such requirements as Beneficial Ownership and Environmental Transparency.

Government

Starting with the existing regulatory regime, which includes Law 155-17 against money laundering, the financing of terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and Law 340-06 on public procurement and contracting, we have opportunities, as a country, due to the draft Mining Act currently going through the National Congress, which strengthens the transparency of the sector and modernises processes, as well as the draft bill for the distribution of mining income, currently being reviewed for submission to the National Congress, among other initiatives that could be recommended by the EITI National Committee.

Ghana:

The Government has recently launched a Ghana Beyond Aid policy, which the MSG and civil society stakeholders can leverage in their messaging around corruption in extractives.

Guinea:

The existence of the National Agency for the Fight Against Corruption and rigorous application of the Anti-Corruption Law will be beneficial, as will the inclusion of measures conditioning the renewal of licenses and permits, proper application of the National Agency for the Financing of Local Communities (ANAFIC) and the National Policy for the Local Content of Local Development Plans and Annual Investment Plans.

Madagaskar:

- Creation of the "Centrale de l'Or" gold-trading exchange.
- Work to improve the "Standard terms and conditions" in order to establish a generally-used "mining contract specification".
- Improvement of key mining functions of the Ministry of Mines and Strategic Resources is under way in the Ministry of Mines, with the support of the Project to Improve Management Frameworks in the Extractive Sector.
- Alignment of the objectives of the Ministry of Mines and Strategic Resources with General Programme of the State (PGE) 21 and the Initiative for the Emergence of Madagascar.
- Study on identifying vulnerabilities to and risks of corruption in the allocation of mining permits in Madagascar, conducted by Transparency International Madagascar Initiative.

Mauritania:

In Mauritania, there are various policy opportunities related to the fight against corruption, including: The National Strategy for the Fight against Corruption, which gave birth to the creation of a National Observatory for the Fight against Corruption. The Multi-Stakeholder Group could take advantage of these opportunities because certain members of civil society are members of the anti-corruption observatory.

Niger:

The opportunities present in Niger are:

- The 2010 Constitution in its articles 149 and 150;
- The existence of the demonstrated political will of the Government to promote good governance and effective and sustainable management of extractive resources;

- Niger's accession to Community codes (WAEMU and ECOWAS) and to the Africa Mining Vision;
- The return of Niger to the EITI process;
- The existence of the High Authority to Combat Corruption and Related Offences (HALCIA);
- The existence of civil society organisations dedicated to the fight against corruption.

Philippines:

Civil society

So far, there are a lot of anti-corruption policies but they are short of real implementation. Perhaps the MSG should review again the anti-corruption policies of the government and other International based organizations so that they can design a local-specific anti-corruption policies.

Government

Propose the institutionalization of PH-EITI through legislation. This would ensure government support and continuity of PH-EITI initiatives.

Industry

The MSG could take advantage of the current administration's strong anti-corruption stance to include or take on corruption in the extractives sector.

Republic of Congo:

Our MSG has not yet decided on how to conduct this action.

Senegal:

The reform of the 2014 law on the declaration of assets, the definition of a national strategy to combat corruption (OFNAC), the publication of reports on the management of public finances (Court of Auditors), and reports on fiscal expenditure (Ministry of Finance and the Budget).

Sierra Leone:

- Strong political will demonstrated by the government in the ongoing legislative and institutional reforms, as well as the cooperation of government with EITI processes and recommendations;
- Scaled up effort of the country Anti-Corruptions Commission (ACC) in fighting corruption;
- Adequate legal support to ACC – ACC Act, 2019;
- Ongoing technical capacity building in the Auditor General's Office
- National legal sector reform – e.g., the Extractive Industries Act – 2018;
- Active and proactive Civil society cooperation;
- Untapped natural resource wealth;

Tanzania:

Strong political will through enforcement of strong anti-corruption policies and legal reforms. In addition, MSG as a neutral player, should focus more on corruption awareness and participation by the society at large as well as promote transparent and fairness in the course of the process execution.

Timor-Leste:

Industry

Considering current situation in Timor-Leste, where the extractive industry exists in a relatively smaller scale, it is difficult to identify any leaverages.

Trinidad and Tobago:

The MSG has linked its work on BO disclosure to the country's action plan to address Financial Action Task Force recommendations. The country is currently on an EU blacklist and by promoting BO disclosure and sensitizing the public on BO, the TTEITI has helped Government address its FATF obligations.

Civil society

Some opportunities in Trinidad & Tobago for the MSG to leverage in its work against corruption in the extractive sector include:

- The Beneficial Ownership Act is now law (as of May 2019) - we should advocate for immediate enforcement of the provisions;
- Early implementation of the Procurement Legislation and make the award of mining licenses subject to the legislation;
- Review and implement a robust regime for monitoring and compliance of extractive industries;
- Review and empower EMA with respect to damage to the environment by extractive industries;
- Bring all extractive industries under the EITI mandate.

Ukraine:

Timely EITI Report publication and on-line platform creation should be included in the anti-corruption policies of the country.

UK:

The UK government already has strong anti-corruption policies and transparency agenda. e.g. we are members of the Open Government Partnership.

6. What support would the MSG need to enable it to use the EITI process in fighting corruption?

Afghanistan:

Civil society

The MSG would need Capacity Building for enabling itself in fighting corruption.

Civil society (2)

- Links to people/orgs who can analyse and use the data
- Support on developing new mechanisms roles, research on existing measures

Albania:

One of the support MSG would need to enable it to use the EITI process in the fight against corruption capacity building for use of EITI data to identify red flags and technical assistance to define the mandate of MSG in addressing corruption.

Argentina:

It is considered key to prioritise the National Technical Secretariat and provide it with the technical and human resources for it to develop as an independent body that continuously provides the MSG with analysis, information and proposals for policies and actions.

Armenia:

Civil society

Discussion of corruption risks together with international actors (rather than local CSOs only) could be useful for the MSG. Also, capacity building on corruption related matters, including corruption risks and factors, and on identification of red flags could be an excellent opportunity to understand the risks and vulnerabilities.

Government

One of the main activities the Anti-corruption Strategy is development of the BO register, thus EITI will have a direct input in the implementation of this Strategy and further improvements of BO registers by using international best practice exchange.

Burkina Faso:

The MSG would need its capacity to be built in the use of EITI data to detect the warning signals of corruption.

Chad:

The necessary support will be:

- The definition of an unequivocal mandate for the Multi-Stakeholder Group on this subject;
- Support from a technical support person;
- The capacity building of members of the Multi-Stakeholder Group.

Civil society

Technical assistance to define the mandate of the Multi-Stakeholder Group in the fight against corruption and capacity building in the use of EITI data to detect warning signs.

Building capacity in the use of data.

Industry

The Multi-Stakeholder Group needs capacity building in the use of EITI data to identify warning signs and it also needs technical assistance to define its mandate in the fight against corruption. The one does not exclude the other.

National Secretariat

Capacity building in the use of EITI data to identify warning signs, or technical assistance to define the mandate of the Multi-Stakeholder Group in the fight against corruption.

Cote d'Ivoire:

The MSG would need strong political support and capacity building in the use of EITI data to detect warning signals, but it would also need technical and financial support from development partners.

Democratic Republic of Congo:

Civil society

Technical assistance will be a very important support for the Multi-Stakeholder Group in the fight against corruption, as well as for building the capacity of civil society stakeholders.

Dominican Republic:

Civil society

In addition to the two proposals within this question, there is a need: i) To deepen and broaden the content of EITI-RD reports and, especially, to urgently address substantive aspects of the processes of oversight and indispensable reforms; ii) To decisively overcome the Dominican Government's lack of knowledge and transparency on the use of resources generated by the EI and its due accountability. It is not possible to continue to finance current-account spending in the public budget through non-renewable natural resources; and iii) To make it mandatory for EI companies to publish audited financial statements or to lift the "Duty of Tax Confidentiality" for any citizen interested in consulting and studying the financial results of companies in this sector.

Government

It would be important to build capacity to be able to identify warning signs, as well as technical assistance to the Multi-Stakeholder Group to identify mechanisms for the detection of any possible risks of corruption that might exist.

Ghana:

Civil Society stakeholders in particular, will require capacity strengthening in data analysis, and use of EITI data to expose corruption. Without strengthening the demand-side of social accountability, not much can be achieved in terms of anti-corruption reforms.

Guinea:

Strengthening capacity for the use of EITI data to detect alarm signals.

Madagaskar:

- Ensure better organisation of the Executive Secretariat.
- Strengthen capacity in the use of EITI data to detect alarm signals.

Mauritania:

Naturally, the Multi-Stakeholder Group will need capacity building in the fields of the use and analysis of EITI data (licenses, beneficial ownership of service provision and procurement, social investment) to better track possible corrupt activities.

Niger:

On this issue, the MSG will need capacity building in the use of EITI data.

Philippines:

Civil society

Aside from Capacity building, multiple projects on anti-corruption that will be implemented at the sub-national level should be made. Massive projects of this kind should be carried out together with the NGOs.

Government

Capacitate the MSG through trainings and workshops, and maintain open communication regarding extractive sector governance.

Industry

The MSG must go beyond ensuring that the data being generated and reported in the country report is accurate; it must go into an analysis of the data. We must reexamine our reporting template and procedure to truly surface corruption/irregularities in the payment of taxes, fees, royalties and other government impositions. Variance (or the lack thereof) between what governments and companies declare does not necessarily equate to corruption (or the lack thereof). Disclosures must relate tax payments to declared production volume and value to determine whether the correct taxes were paid.

Republic of Congo:

Our MSG has not yet decided on the type of support for this action.

Senegal:

Building the capacity of members of the Multi-Stakeholder Group to identify points of vulnerability in the extractive sector, and in the use of data.

Sierra Leone:

Technical Assistance – stakeholders recommended that MSG and SLEITI are both supported with adequate technical materials such as appropriate evidence-based information gathering tools. Technical support also requires support/ supervision from key local and international experts.

Capacity building – Stakeholders requested for sectoral capacity building – starting with the SLEITI Secretariat staff, the MSG and its constituent partners.

Tanzania:

Capacity building for use of EITI data to identify corruption risks as well as technical assistance to define the MSG’s mandate in addressing corruption considering that most members in the TEITI committee for period of 2019-2022 is new in EITI process.

Timor-Leste:

Industry

Additional capacity building for the MSG as well as greater commitment or support from the government to MSG through the EITI Secretariat

Trinidad and Tobago:

The MSG needs capacity building/technical assistance to help members use EITI data to raise red flags on corruption.

Civil society

The TTEITI Secretariat which supports the MSG will require additional human resource capacity to undertake the necessary anti-corruption research and education.

Ukraine:

There are numerous NGO dealing with the anti-corruption issues in Ukraine therefore it would be beneficial to engage them in working with the EITI Report as anti-corruption instrument.

UK:

None. The UK already has a robust anti-corruption and transparency agenda.

Consolidated, from **Anglophone Africa** regional call¹:

- EITI is a 'tool' in the tool box for governments to address corruption.
- EITI is not an enforcer of wrongdoing, but may still contribute to mitigating corruption, provided that the right information is disclosed in a timely and comprehensive manner.
- EITI can contribute by systematically providing consolidated information in a single place for law enforcement.
- EITI dissemination efforts could be scaled up to target law enforcement agencies who are potential important users of EITI Reports. These law enforcement agencies may face challenges with accessing the information even from other government agencies, which is where the EITI can add value by facilitating data sharing and disclosures.
- Example was shared from Zambia where EITI has collaborated with the Office of the Auditor General on auditing license awards and identifying weaknesses in licensing procedures and lack of implementation, poses certain corruption risks.
- Other topics where the EITI could support the government in mitigating corruption risks relate to local content and environmental protection (management of environmental rehabilitation funds)
- Implementing countries and MSGs need support not only with identifying gaps and risks, but guidance on what to do to address them.

Consolidated, from **Francophone Africa** regional call²:

- There are already dedicated anti-corruption structures nationally and internationally and duplication of tasks should be avoided.
- An attempt to take-over the mandate of these anti-corruption bodies may simply weaken them. Similarly, a focus on fighting corruption can cause the EITI to lose focus on its primary objectives.
- The EITI should instead find synergies with anticorruption authorities, including better use of EITI data as red flags and fostering further collaboration with judiciary and supreme audit structures (which already publish audited data on state finances).
- The EITI needs to find its narrative in the fight against corruption (corruption prevention). The EITI's focus on transparency is already contributing towards this.
- This was linked to the Validation process as a diagnostic tool for identifying and improving weaknesses in government institutions, in a bid to fight corruption and provide accountability.

¹ Representatives from Ghana, Nigeria and Zambia participated in the call

² Representatives from Senegal, Burkina Faso, Cameroun, DRC, Guinea, Mali, Niger, ROC and Togo participated in this call

Consolidated, from **Southeast Asia** regional calls:

- The EITI is already a tool for addressing corruption, although there is room for doing more within the normal procedures of implementation
- BO is seen as a main area for EITI to fight corruption. BO disclosure should be developed further, as now there is no practical template to make BO disclosures useful
- The reporting templates should be revisited, to make them more suitable for capturing corruption risks. There should be a way to relay tax payments that can highlight any possible corruption risks
- CSOs need to be part of any anti corruption approach
- There is a need to step up awareness of the EITI with many local businesses

³ Representatives from the Philippines and Myanmar participated in this call

Annex 1 (from Tanzania's response)

	Principle	Possibility/Type of Corruption	Form of Corruption	Measures to be Considered
1.	the prudent use of natural resource wealth should drive sustainable economic growth that contributes to sustainable development and poverty reduction, and should be managed properly , to avoid negative economic and social impacts.	Both corporate and political institutional corruption/institutional actors corruption	Dishonesty, bias, weak mindedness, recklessness	Look for goatsucking, escapism & flimsy excuses in all forms of communications
2.	management of natural resource wealth for the benefit of a country's citizens is in the domain of sovereign governments to be exercised in the interests of their national development.	Political institutional corruption	Structurally dependent corruption	Moral responsibility held on relevant agents

3.	the benefits of resource extraction occur as revenue streams over many years and can be highly price dependent.	Both corporate and political institutional corruption/institutional actors corruption	Dishonesty, bias, weak mindedness, recklessness	Look for goatscaping, escapism & flimsy excuses in all forms of communications
4.	a public understanding of government revenues and expenditure over time could help public debate and inform choice of appropriate and realistic options for sustainable development.	Deception corruption	Bribing illiterate/non-critical thinking public	Fix a threshold level of literacy for a country to climb higher in EITI
5.	the importance of transparency by governments and companies in the extractive industries and the need to enhance public financial management and accountability.	Deception corruption	Bribing illiterate/non-critical thinking public	Fix a threshold level of literacy for a country to climb higher in EITI; ask for report of public engagement and its results
6.	achievement of greater transparency must be set in the	Deception corruption	Bribing illiterate/non-critical	Audit of legal and contractual performance

	context of respect for contracts and laws.		thinking public	
7.	the enhanced environment for domestic and foreign direct investment that financial transparency may bring.	Covert dealings	Institutional corruption	Ask for Doing Business Index score of a country
8.	practice of accountability by government to all citizens for the stewardship of revenue streams and public expenditure.	As in Serial Number 2 above.		
9.	high standards of transparency and accountability in public life, government operations and in business.	As in Serial Number 1 above.		
10.	a broadly consistent and workable approach to the disclosure of payments and revenues is required, which is simple to undertake and to use.	Current processes and procedures in reporting to be made more rigorous, especially contentwise.		

11.	payments' disclosure in a given country should involve all extractive industry companies operating in that country.	Surrogate complicity	Surrogate corruption by shell/shadow companies	Report should include stock exchange listing of EI companies in hosting country
12.	all stakeholders have important and relevant contributions to make - including governments and their agencies, extractive industry companies, service companies, multilateral organisations, financial organisations, investors and non-governmental organisations.	Structural corruption	Bribing stakeholders to withhold information	Conduct a general survey of all stakeholders to determine the extent of their contribution made