The Board agreed that Senegal has made satisfactory progress in implementing the 2016 Standard.

There are regular, public statements of support from the government, a senior individual has been appointed to lead on the implementation of the EITI and senior government officials are represented on the MSG. In the International Secretariat’s view, Senegal has gone beyond the minimum requirement given the government’s meaningful use of the EITI to drive reforms. The government has enacted legal reforms to facilitate EITI implementation and actively followed up with non-reporting companies, while also using the EITI by proactively following up on EITI recommendations to drive further reforms in the governance of mining, oil and gas.

Mining, oil and gas companies are actively and effectively engaged in the EITI process, both as providers of information and in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the EITI process. Industry representatives are taking part in outreach and efforts to promote public debate, both at a national level and in regional roadshows. The introduction of legal requirements for EITI participation in sector legislation for mining (in November 2016) and oil and gas (planned for 2017), is bolstering the institutionalisation of EITI in Senegal.

There are no suggestions of any legal, regulatory or practical barriers to civil society’s ability to engage in EITI-related public debate, to operate freely, to communicate and cooperate with each other, to fully, actively and effectively engage on EITI-related matters or in relation to the EITI process. It appears that CSOs are able to speak freely on transparency and natural resource governance issues as well as to ensure that the EITI contributes to public debate. In addition, civil society is fully, actively and effectively engaged in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the EITI process. Stakeholders are taking part in outreach and efforts to promote public debate, especially on regional level.

The MSG has been formed and includes self-appointed representatives from each stakeholder group with no suggestion of interference or coercion, even if nominations procedures for industry and civil society have yet to be publicly codified. While not formalised by civil society itself, the mechanism for civil society nominations on the MSG was open to the public, both in the initial nominations ahead of the Senegal’s EITI application in 2013 and in 2015, and CSO members of the MSG are operationally and in policy terms independent from government and companies. Information on nominations procedures is publicly available. The ToR for the MSG addresses the requirements of the EITI Standard and stakeholders have not highlighted any significant deviations from the ToR in practice. Meetings are convened with sufficient advance warning and MSG members generally appear to have sufficient time to review documents ahead of meetings. Attendance of the large majority of MSG members is consistent. The MSG’s per diem policy is clearly described on the EITI Senegal website and in line with national legislation.

The 2017 EITI Senegal work plan and the 2017-2021 strategic plan are publicly accessible, produced in a timely manner and updated annually, with objectives aligned with national priorities. The work plan also includes specific activities to follow up on recommendations from EITI reporting. The three constituencies have consulted their broader stakeholder groups in preparing annual work plans since 2013. Delays in work plan implementation appear reasonable given funding constraints.

The 2014 EITI Report highlights the mining, oil and gas licenses awarded and transferred in 2014 and describes the general statutory procedures for awarding and transferring such licenses, which is vague in terms of the specific technical and financial criteria assessed. It provides a description of the actual procedures followed for awarding and transferring the licenses in 2014, including some technical and financial criteria assessed. Given the lack of specificity in the regulations, the IA considers that the transfer of oil and gas licenses was in line with statutory procedures. The descriptions provided of the mining license awards in 2014 appear in line with statutory procedures, even if this is not explicitly stated in the 2014 EITI Report. However, the 2014 EITI Report does not comment on any non-trivial deviations in the award of 14 artisanal mining licenses and 21 quarrying licenses awarded in 2014. The MSG has contracted a dedicated study into mining, oil and gas license allocations and transfers in the 2014-16 period to support concrete policy reform proposals, which it expects to publish in the final quarter of 2017.

While the 2014 EITI Report and EITI Senegal website provide most of the information on mining, oil and gas licenses held by material companies, the date of expiry of one mining exploration license is missing. However, stakeholders confirmed that this license, held by the government as an artisanal gold mining corridor, did not have a date of expiry in 2014. While dates of award and/or expiry are missing for a handful of quarrying licenses, none of these is held by a material company included in the scope of reporting for the 2014 EITI Report.

The 2014 EITI Report clarifies the government’s policy on publishing all mining, oil and gas contracts and describes the actual practice. In the Secretariat’s view, Senegal has also gone beyond the minimum requirements by making contracts public as encouraged by the EITI Standard.

The 2014 EITI Report provides an overview of relevant laws and regulations, government entities and fiscal terms, including the degree of fiscal devolution, in the mining, oil and gas sectors as well as brief commentary on current reforms.

The Government of Senegal has publicly stated its policy on beneficial ownership disclosure and the 2014 EITI Report provides the names of legal owners and their level of ownership of all but four material companies.

The 2014 EITI Report provides a comprehensive list of companies in which the government holds equity and clarifies that state participation in Petrosen gives rise to material revenues. The report clarifies the actual practice of financial relations between the two SOEs Miferso and Petrosen in 2014, but does not clearly describe the statutory rules governing the financial relations between Petrosen and Miferso and the national government, aside from referring to them as commercially incorporated companies. While the report provides information on the terms associated with state equity in the mining sector, it only states that the terms of Petrosen’s stakes in oil and gas projects is defined in each contract. While the full-text of all but Total’s 2017 oil and gas contract has been published and the 2014 EITI Report provides guidance on how to access them, it does not clearly describe the terms associated with Petrosen equity in each PSC in the report itself. The report clarifies the lack of changes in state participation in the mining sector in 2014, but not in oil and gas. Finally, while the report clarifies that the government did not provide any loans or guarantees to the two SOEs in 2014 and that these two SOEs did not provide any loans or guarantees to extractives companies in 2014, it does not clarify whether the government extended any loans or guarantees to other extractives companies directly in 2014.

The 2014 EITI Report provides an overview of the extractives industries, including significant exploration activities.

The 2014 EITI Report provides production volumes for all 15 mineral ommodities produced in Senegal in 2014, but not values (other than for natural gas). Given that reported production data is based on material companies’ EITI disclosures rather than on official data, the comprehensiveness of reported production data is unclear.

The 2014 EITI Report provides export volumes and values for all ten minerals exported from Senegal in 2014, although the sourcing of reported data from companies’ EITI disclosures and the significant discrepancies with official government data raise significant questions regarding the comprehensiveness and reliability of data reported.

The 2014 EITI Report describes the structure of a transaction related to the Teranga-OJVG acquisition as a barter, whereby the government renounced an option to acquire a stake in Teranga in exchange for the provision of infrastructure for the host community. While the 2014 EITI Report describes the transaction and the project, it only states that “the majority” of the USD 1.5m in infrastructure provided under the transaction in 2014 was through an Agricultural Development Project, but does not specify the exact breakdown in infrastructure development in 2014. However, as of 22 September 2017, additional information on the barter transaction was provided on the EITI Senegal website, disaggregated by transaction.

The International Secretariat’s initial assessment is that this requirement is not applicable to Senegal in the year under review (2014). The 2014 EITI Report confirms the lack of direct subnational payments, although it could do more in explaining the centralised nature of public accounts and lack of tax-levying powers at the subnational level.

The data is disaggregated by individual company, revenue stream and government entity for all revenue streams. It is also encouraging that EITI Senegal has made detailed reconciliation tables in open data format available on its website.

The reconciliation of payments and revenues has been undertaken by an IA, appointed by the MSG, and applying international professional standards. The IA and the MSG agreed ToR for the production of the 2014 EITI Report consistent with the standard ToR and agreed upon procedures issued by the EITI Board, and applied this ToR and procedures in practice. The final report provides a clear statement from the IA on the comprehensiveness and reliability of the (financial) data presented, including an informative summary of the work performed by the IA and the limitations of the assessment provided. While the report indicates a coverage of the reconciliation exercise, based on the government's disclosure of total revenues which omit one exceptional payment to government, it is possible to calculate the final reconciliation coverage.

The 2014 EITI Report includes a definition of the materiality thresholds for payments and companies to be included in reconciliation, including a justification for why the threshold was set at this level. The MSG was involved in setting the materiality threshold for payments and for companies. Requirement 4.1.b.viii of the EITI Standard requires that implementing countries include “any other significant payments and material benefit to government” in the scope of reconciliation. While the MSG decided to exclude an exceptional payment from Mittal Steel Holding AG worth XOF 49bn, or roughly 45% of government extractives revenues in 2014, from the scope of reconciliation, the 2014 EITI Report justifies this decision given the exceptional nature of the payment and the lack of jurisdiction to compel the company to participate in EITI reporting given the end of contractual relations between Mittal Steel and the government following the conclusion of arbitration. All material companies and government entities reported comprehensively all material payments and revenues in the 2014 EITI Report and full unilateral government disclosures were provided. While the exclusion of a significant payment to government from the scope of reconciliation poses a procedural challenge under Requirement 4.1.b.viii, the International Secretariat considers that the broader objective of revenue transparency was achieved given publicly-accessible evidence of the payment in ArcelorMittal’s financial statements audited to international standards, the exceptional nature of the payment and the practical constraints on the ability of Senegal’s MSG to follow up with the company.

The 2014 EITI Report describes the general statutory procedures for Petrosen’s commercialisation of the state’s in-kind revenues and confirms that the state’s statutory in-kind revenue entitlements from Senegal’s sole producing license are commercialised by the operator, who transfers the proceeds in cash to the government. The International Secretariat understands that there are no regulatory provisions for the state to receive any in-kind revenues from the mining sector.

The 2014 EITI Report describes two arrangements whereby the government receives transportation revenues, in mining and oil and gas respectively. It provides descriptions of the arrangements, the tariffs paid and the total revenues collected, although it does not explicitly provide the volumes and value of minerals and natural gas transported. In line with the EITI Board’s decision on Mongolia’s 2016 Validation, where it found that revenues collected by the part government-owned railway were not covered by Requirement 4.4 given that the railway was not considered a SOE for EITI reporting purposes, the International Secretariat considers that this requirement is not applicable to Senegal’s mining sector in the year under review. While the 2014 EITI Report’s lack of explicit figures for volumes and value of natural gas transported in Petrosen’s 10km pipeline is a concern, it is possible to calculate these figures based on data provided in the 2014 EITI Report. In addition, the total transportation revenues of XOF 19,173,159 (USD 39,524) under the arrangement could be considered immaterial. As such, the International Secretariat’s assessment is that Senegal has made satisfactory progress towards meeting this requirement.

The 2014 EITI Report discloses and reconciles company payments to Petrosen, payments from Petrosen to the Treasury and from Treasury to Miferso and Petrosen. The International Secretariat received no information that suggested any company payment to SOEs or SOE payments to government were excluded from the scope of reporting.

Senegal has published EITI Reports on an annual basis and the data has not been older than the second to the last complete accounting period. The MSG approved the reporting period. There is evidence of EITI Senegal making efforts to go beyond the minimum requirement by exploring opportunities to disclose data as soon as practically possible, both through timelier EITI Reports as well as through continuous online disclosures.

The 2014 EITI Report clearly highlights the extractives revenues that are not recorded in the national budget and provides a general explanation for the allocation of off-budget extractives revenues, such as those retained by Petrosen.

Similar to the situation in the Republic of Congo, there is a legal framework for subnational transfers of extractives revenues in Senegal but it was not operational in 2014 given the lack of implementing regulations. The 2014 EITI Report clearly demonstrates that statutory subnational transfers in the mining sector were not operational in 2014.

It is encouraging that the MSG has made some attempt to including information on the budget-making auditing process in the 2014 EITI Report.

The 2014 EITI Report describes mandatory social expenditures in both mining and oil and gas and discloses these comprehensively, clearly identifying non-government beneficiaries where applicable and describing in-kind expenditures and their deemed value. In the Secretariat’s view, Senegal has gone beyond the minimum requirements by providing additional information on discretionary social expenditures as encouraged by the EITI Standard.

The 2014 EITI Report could have been clearer in describing the MSG’s approach to demonstrating the lack of quasi-fiscal expenditures by either Miferso or Petrosen.

Despite constraints in the granularity of official macro-economic and employment statistics, the 2014 EITI Report provides estimates of the extractive industries’ contribution, in absolute and relative terms, to GDP, government revenues, exports and employment, identifying the location of production. While there are concerns over the comprehensiveness of extractives employment data, the 2014 EITI Report is transparent about limitations and provides material companies’ reporting of their staffing levels.

Senegal’s EITI data is available in machine readable format through the Senegal EITI website and the EITI global website, drawing on summary data tables completed by the national secretariat. Senegal EITI has also published summaries of EITI Reports in accessible infographic format for the first two EITI Reports. The MSG is exploring options for ensuring even timelier reporting through online disclosures.

The MSG has reviewed progress and outcomes of implementation on a regular basis, including by publishing annual progress reports over the past three years. Senegal’s 2016 EITI annual progress report provided an assessment of impact of EITI implementation and was the product of consultations within each of the three constituencies.

The Senegal EITI Reports are comprehensible, actively promoted through varied channels (including print, online and through active outreach), publicly accessible and have tangibly contributed to public debate on the extractive industries in Senegal. In the Secretariat’s view, Senegal has made some efforts to go beyond the minimum requirements by developing visualisations of EITI information actively disseminated through online and physical channels, including regular subnational outreach and dissemination. The three stakeholder groups have also actively contributed to dissemination of EITI information in their bilateral interactions.

The MSG and the government have taken steps to act upon lessons learnt, to identify, investigate and address the causes of any discrepancies and weaknesses of the EITI process and to consider the recommendations for improvements from the IA. In the International Secretariat’s view, Senegal has gone beyond the minimum requirements given the MSG’s proactive role in formulating recommendations of EITI Reports, assessing and following up on the IA’s findings and recommendations and implementation of reforms starting with Senegal’s first EITI Report.